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McKEE, Circuit Judge 
     Willis Morton, Administrator of the New Jersey State Prison 
at Trenton, and Peter Verniero, Attorney General of the State of 
New Jersey, appeal the district court's order granting a writ of 
habeas corpus to appellee, Earl Berryman. The district court 
granted the writ based upon its determination that Berryman had 
been denied effective assistance of trial counsel. For the 
reasons set forth below, we will affirm. 
 
                                I. 
     March 11, 1983 was Alice Campos' eighteenth birthday.  
According to Campos, she and her friend, Christina Dos Santos, 
went to a club called "Studio One" in Newark, New Jersey, where a 
group of between 15 and 20 friends joined them to celebrate 
Campos' birthday.  At approximately 2:30 a.m. on March 12, Campos 
and Dos Santos left the club, and Campos drove Dos Santos to the 
Irvington, New Jersey home of Dos Santos' mother, where Campos 
dropped Dos Santos off. 
     Shortly after driving away, Campos stopped at a traffic 
light and a man whom she later identified as Michael Bunch forced 
his way into her car.  According to Campos' subsequent trial 
testimony, Bunch put a knife to her throat and forced his way 
into the driver's seat.  Bunch then told Campos to remove her 
stockings. Campos responded by removing her panty hose and 
handing them to Bunch. 
     Bunch then opened the front passenger door and a man Campos 
later identified as Anthony Bludson got in and sat next to 
Campos.  Bunch took $35 from Campos' purse, and ordered "[d]on't 
think about running because my friend got a gun."  Campos then 
heard what she thought was the "click" of a gun; however, she 
never saw a gun.   
     Bunch and Bludson drove to a nearby supermarket parking lot 
where a man Campos later identified as petitioner, Earl Berryman, 
was waiting in a blue car.  Campos was ordered to get into the 
rear seat of the blue car which Bunch then drove while Berryman 
sat in the front passenger seat, and Bludson sat in the rear with 
Campos.  Campos testified that she could see the faces of all 
three men. According to her testimony, Berryman's face was only 
six to eight inches away as she was getting into the blue car.  
In her initial statement to police, however, Campos said she was 
blindfolded with her stockings after Bunch and Bludson got into 
her car, and before they were joined by the male identified as 
Berryman. 
     The trio drove Campos around for about two hours. They made 
her lie down on the floor of the back of the car that entire 
time.  Finally, the car stopped at a "burned-out" building, and 
the three carried Campos inside.  Once inside the building they 
made her remove her clothes and lie down on a mattress.  Each of 
the three men then took turns raping her.  
     According to her testimony, after the sexual assault, the 
three men ordered her to get dressed, and Bludson put a knife in 
her back and walked her back to the blue car.  They all got in, 
and Bunch drove the entire group back to Campos' car. There, 
Campos was released, and the three men drove away. 
     Later that same morning, at approximately 6:00, Campos 
returned to Dos Santos' house, and told Dos Santos and Dos 
Santos' mother what had happened. Campos testified that she was 
ashamed, frightened, and hysterical. Because she was so upset and 
because she did not think she could report the incident until the 
next business day, she did not report the rape for two days.  
     When she did contact the police on Monday, March 14, 
Detective Samuel Williams of the Irvington Township Police 
Department had her look through photographs of Black males 
arranged alphabetically by last name (the names were not visible 
to Campos) in "sleeves", or "books". Each book contained 
approximately 100 to 150 photographs.  Campos looked at all of 
the photographs in the first sleeve that contained only 
photographs of Black men whose last name began with "A".  She was 
unable to identify anyone, and proceeded to the "B" sleeve. She 
selected the photographs of Earl Berryman, Michael Bunch and 
Anthony Lee Bludson from that book.  Campos did not look at any 
more photographs because she appeared to have identified all 
three of her attackers from the "B" sleeve. Thus, she never saw 
police photos of anyone whose last name ended in the letters "C" 
through "Z".  
     That same day, Campos was examined by Ingrid Brown, M.D.   
Dr. Brown found physical evidence consistent with rape, and also 
discovered that Campos was infected with vaginal and rectal 
gonorrhea. Campos did not have gonorrhea before the assault. Dr. 
Brown did not attempt to use a "rape kit" to retrieve traces of 
any excretions that could have identified the attackers because 
of the amount of time that had passed since the assault.  
     Based upon Campos' identifications, Detective Williams sent 
letters to the last known address of Berryman, Bunch and Bludson, 
but Berryman's letter was returned to the police by the post 
office on March 17, 1983. 
     Despite repeated requests from Detective Williams, Campos 
did not return to police headquarters to sign a complaint until 
April 21, 1983.  In the meantime, Detective Williams did nothing 
further to ascertain where Berryman lived, and he apparently 
investigated the matter no further.  Williams testified that he 
took no further action because his superior, Sergeant Michael 
Tomich, told him to "lay off" the rape investigation. Bunch was a 
suspect in an unrelated, but ongoing, bank robbery/homicide 
investigation which had taken place two days after the rape, and  
Detective Tomich apparently hoped that Bunch would incriminate 
himself in the more serious homicide if he remained on the 
street.    
     More than a year passed before the police tried to arrest 
anyone.  Finally, on January 19, 1984, Berryman, Bludson and 
Bunch were named in a seven-count indictment and charged with 
various offenses stemming from the kidnapping, and assault of 
Campos.  Bludson's trial was severed from the joint trial of 
Berryman and Bunch. Bludson went to trial first, and had to be 
tried twice because his initial trial ended with a hung jury and 
a mistrial. His second trial resulted in an acquittal.  
     Berryman and Bunch went to trial in March of 1985.  Their 
first trial also ended in a mistrial when a juror disclosed her 
improper discussions with fellow jurors. The retrial began 
immediately, and concluded with the conviction of both Berryman 
and Bunch. Berryman was sentenced in July of l985 to an aggregate 
term of imprisonment of 50 years with a parole ineligibility 
period of 25 years. 
     At his trial, Berryman denied participation in the crime. He 
took the stand in his own defense and testified that he had 
neither a driver's license nor car, and that he had never met 
Bunch nor Bludson.  Berryman had a steady employment history and 
had not previously been indicted. His conviction rested entirely 
upon Ms. Campos' uncorroborated identification. 
     Campos had testified at both of Bunch's trials before 
testifying against Berryman and Bludson. Her testimony at the 
Bunch trials differed from the descriptions she gave in 
Berryman's trial, yet, Berryman's attorney did not use the prior 
inconsistent testimony to cast doubt upon Campos' identification. 
He also failed to call either Bludson or Dos Santos as defense 
witnesses. Berryman's attorney did, however, manage to elicit 
testimony that allowed the jury to discover that Bunch was under 
investigation for a bank robbery homicide which tended to 
associate Berryman with that investigation, and with Bunch.  
      
                               II. 
     Berryman and Bunch appealed their convictions to the 
Appellate Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey.  They 
alleged that the trial court had improperly admitted evidence of 
the unrelated homicide investigation, and that they had been 
denied the effective assistance of trial counsel. However, the 
Appellate Division affirmed the trial court's determination that 
defense counsel had opened the door to the admission of the 
testimony regarding the unrelated bank robbery homicide 
investigation.  The Appellate Division also held that any 
evidence as to why Bludson was not called as a witness was 
outside the scope of the record. However, the court allowed 
issues relating to trial counsel's effectiveness to be raised in 
a motion for post-conviction relief.  Further direct review of 
the conviction was apparently not sought. 
     Berryman and Bunch then filed petitions for post-conviction 
relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel.  Berryman 
argued that his counsel had been ineffective (1) in failing to 
use Campos' inconsistent identification testimony from the 
Bludson trial; (2) in opening the door to the admission of 
testimony concerning the bank robbery homicide investigation of 
Bunch; and (3) in failing to call Bludson and Dos Santos as 
defense witnesses.   
     Berryman's trial attorney testified at a hearing that was 
held on the post-conviction petition, and explained his reasons 
for conducting Berryman's defense as he had. The post-conviction 
hearing court thereafter issued an oral opinion in which it found 
that trial counsel had made a reasonable investigation to 
determine the location of Bludson; that the determination not to 
call Dos Santos as a witness had been a strategic one; that 
Campos' inconsistent testimony at the Bludson trial would have 
been insignificant, and in any event, that failure to impeach her 
with it had been an appropriate strategic choice by defense 
counsel; and that counsel's actions in opening the door to the 
bank robbery homicide investigation of Bunch also had been a 
reasonable trial strategy.  The court further concluded, as to 
each allegation of ineffectiveness, that even if the performance 
had been deficient, the deficiency did not deprive Berryman of a 
fair trial.  The Appellate Division affirmed in an unpublished 
written opinion, New Jersey v. Berryman, A2388-91T5 (App. Div. 
May 20, 1993) (hereinafter referred to as "slip opinion"), and 
the New Jersey Supreme Court denied certification.  
 
                               III. 
     Berryman filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the 
district court for the district of New Jersey pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 2254.  The district court summarized Berryman's claim 
of ineffectiveness as follows:   
                    petitioner's counsel Nicholas DePalma 
                     (i) on cross-examination of Campos failed to 
                    avail himself of prior testimony which would 
                    have cast serious doubt upon Campos' ability 
                    to identify petitioner, (ii) failed to 
                    investigate and use two witnesses who could 
                    have cast further doubt on Campos' testimony, 
                    and (iii) asked questions on cross- 
                    examination and called a witness knowing that 
                    these actions would bring to the jury's 
                    attention the fact that co-defendant Bunch 
                    was under investigation for homicide/bank 
                    robbery.   
                     
          Dist. Ct. Op. at 6-7.  
     The standard for reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance 
of counsel is set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 
(1984): 
 
          First, the defendant must show that counsel's 
          performance was deficient.  This requires 
          showing that counsel made errors so serious 
          that counsel was not functioning as the 
          "counsel" guaranteed the defendant by the 
          Sixth Amendment.  Second, the defendant must 
          show that the deficient performance 
          prejudiced the defense.  This requires 
          showing that counsel's errors were so serious 
          as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, 
          a trial whose result is reliable. 
466 U.S. at 687.  In essence, "the defendant must show that 
counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness" meaning "reasonableness under prevailing 
professional norms."  Id. at 688.  Our review of the district 
court's decision is plenary.  Reese v. Fulcomer, 946 F.2d 247, 
253 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 988 (1992).    
However, our evaluation of counsel's performance is "highly 
deferential" as a reviewing court must make "every effort to 
eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the 
circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate 
the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time."  Id. at 689. 
We "must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct 
falls within a wide range of reasonable professional assistance."  
Id.  That is to say, the "defendant must overcome the presumption 
that, under the circumstances, the challenged action 'might be 
considered sound trial strategy.'"  Id. (quoting Michel v. 
Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101 (1955).   
                               IV. 
     28 U.S.C. § 2254 governs federal habeas corpus proceedings 
instituted by state prisoners.  After Berryman filed his 
petition, 28 U.S.C. § 2254 was amended.  The effect of these 
amendments on Berryman's petition is discussed below.  However, 
since a traditional section 2254 analysis is helpful to an 
understanding of the effect of the amendment, we begin with a 
discussion of the relevant law at the time Berryman filed his 
petition. 
     When Berryman filed his petition in the district court, the 
habeas statute provided that state court findings of fact were 
presumed correct if the following requirements were met: (1) a 
hearing on the merits of a factual issue, (2) made by a state 
court of competent jurisdiction, (3) in a proceeding to which the 
petitioner and the state were parties, (4) evidenced by a written 
finding, opinion or other reliable and adequate written indicia.  
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Reese v. Fulcomer, 946 F.2d 247, 254 (3d 
Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 988 (1992).  Where these 
requirements are met, "'the underlying facts about counsel's 
performance are entitled to the presumption of correctness under 
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), if fairly supported by the record.'" Id. 
(emphasis added).  It is only where the state court's factual 
determinations are not fairly supported by the record, that the 
presumption of correctness does not apply.  28 U.S.C. § 
2254(d)(8).  Section 2254(d) "'reflect[ed] a clear congressional 
policy favoring deference to state findings of fact absent good 
cause for rejecting such findings.'" Id. at 256 (quoting Nelson 
v. Fulcomer, 911 F.2d 928, 932 (3d Cir. 1990)). 
     Factual issues are "basic, primary or historical facts: 
facts 'in the sense of a recital of external events and the 
credibility of their narrators. . . .'"  Townsend v. Sain, 372 
U.S. 293, 309 (1963)(quoting Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 506 
(1953)).  It is these "factual issues" to which the statutory 
presumption of correctness predominately relates.  Thompson v. 
Keohane,     U.S.    , 116 S.Ct. 457, 464 (1995).  "[A] trial 
court is better positioned to make decisions of this genre, and 
[the Supreme Court] has therefore accorded the judgment of the 
jurist-observer presumptive weight."  Keohane, 116 S.Ct. at 464. 
(Citations omitted and internal quotation marks omitted).    
     In a state prisoner's habeas petition alleging ineffective 
assistance of counsel, state court findings of fact made in the 
course of determining an ineffectiveness claim are subject to the 
deference requirement of § 2254(d), so long as they are fairly  
supported by the record.  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 
698; McAleese v. Mazurkiewicz, 1 F.3d 159, 166 (3d Cir.), cert. 
denied,     U.S.    , 114 S.Ct. 645 (1993)(state court findings 
of historical fact made in the course of deciding an  
ineffectiveness claim are presumptively correct if they meet the 
requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)). 
     However, a state court's conclusion that counsel rendered 
effective assistance "is not a finding of fact binding on the 
court to the extent required by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)."  Id.  
Effectiveness is not a question of historical fact.  Id.  As 
noted earlier, an inquiry into effectiveness of counsel under 
Strickland has two components, performance and prejudice, and it 
is a mixed question of law and fact.  Id.; see also Reese v. 
Fulcomer, 946 F.2d 247, 254 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 
U.S. 988 (1992).  Therefore, an ineffectiveness claim "require[s] 
the application of a legal standard to the historical-fact 
determinations."  Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. at 310 n. 6.  In 
brief, the "'ultimate question'" of counsel's effectiveness is 
"outside of §  2254's domain because of its 'uniquely legal 
dimension.'"  Koehane, 116 S.Ct. at 465.  
     Applying these principles to a Strickland ineffectiveness 
analysis, it is apparent that a state court's finding that 
counsel had a trial strategy is a finding of fact to which the 
habeas court must afford the presumption of correctness if that 
factual finding is supported by the record.  However, the 
question of whether counsel's strategy was reasonable goes 
directly to the performance prong of the Strickland test, thus 
requiring the application of legal principles, and de novo 
review. 
                    This Court's review of an ineffective 
                    assistance of counsel claim is de novo 
                    because it is a mixed question of law and 
                    fact.  Subsidiary factual questions found by 
                    state courts are entitled to a presumption of 
                    correctness under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d).  The 
                    question of whether a decision was a tactical 
                    one is a question of fact. . . .  However, 
                    whether this tactic was reasonable is a 
                    question of law, and we owe neither the 
                    district court nor the state court any 
                    deference on this point.   
           
Horton v. Zant, 941 F.2d 1449, 1462 (11th Cir. 1991) (citations 
omitted).   
     Here, a state court has already determined that trial 
counsel's conduct of petitioner's defense was based upon a trial 
strategy, and that the strategy was reasonable.  The district 
court's thoughtful and thorough opinion can be interpreted as 
holding that trial counsel had no trial strategy at all. However, 
it can also be read as concluding that counsel did have a 
strategy, but the state court erred in holding that it was 
reasonable.  We conclude that no matter which way the opinion is 
read, the district court's ruling must be affirmed under a 
traditional § 2254 analysis. 
 
                                V. 
     In discussing trial counsel's explanation for his 
"stewardship" of defendant's defense, the district court stated 
"[f]or counsel to rest on a 'strategy' necessitates the existence 
of one. This case lacked strategy."  Dist. Ct. Op. at 14.  We 
believe that the state court's contrary conclusion that Mr. 
Berryman's trial attorney did have a trial strategy is not 
supported by the record.  The Appellate Division summarized the 
defense strategy as follows: "[t]he defense theory was generally 
that the victim was really not telling the truth about the rape 
and surrounding events and that even the police did not believe 
her."  Slip. Op., at 12.  Thus, that court reasoned that attempts 
to impeach the victim on discrepancies in her descriptions "would 
not have promoted the defense theory that the rape probably did 
not occur," Id. at 21, and defense counsel could not be faulted 
for failing to call Bludson because "the height discrepancy would 
not be persuasive to the jurors and . . .  Bludson['s] testimony 
would not support the defense theory." Id. at 22.  To the extent 
that this conclusion is based upon a finding of fact that trial 
counsel actually had a theory or strategy, we must also afford it 
deference as "section 2254 makes no distinction between the 
factual determinations of a state trial court and those of a 
state appellate court." Dickerson v. Vaughn, 90 F.3d 87, 90 (3d 
Cir. 1996).  However the state court's finding that Mr. DePalma 
based his defense on the "theory" that Ms. Campos was fabricating 
the rape, is belied by the record.  The district court correctly 
noted:  
                    Mr. DePalma's post-trial testimony confirms 
                    that there was no trial strategy.  When 
                    questioned on his theory of the case, he 
                    replied, 'Theory of the case. . . there was 
                    no real theory.'  Again, 
                     
                    Q: Is it your practice to develop theory of 
                    your defense prior to opening to a jury in a 
                    case? 
                     
                    A: Not a theory of my defense, but a game 
                    plan. 
                     
                    Then he claimed he had three theories: '[I]f 
                    you want to use the term theory, I had three 
                    theories, the identification was a theory, . 
                    . .the investigation was theory. . .and I 
                    don't know whether there was something third 
                    in there, but in my mind I think there was.'  
                    Finally, he believed that there was 'no value 
                    to choosing a theory, and proceeding.' 
           
Dist. Ct. Op. at 13-14. (emphasis added).  Moreover, the record 
of the trial corroborates that Mr. DePalma's conduct of 
Berryman's defense was not guided by any strategy or theory.  In 
his closing, Mr. DePalma did suggest that Ms. Campos fabricated 
the rape: "[h]ow do we know she was raped? How do we know she 
didn't consent to the sexual affair?" Dist. Ct. Op. at 36. Yet, 
seconds later, in the same summation he argued: "[l]adies and 
gentlemen, she is not lying. The defense isn't alleging that she 
is lying to you," Id., and he then proceeded to cast doubt upon 
the accuracy of the identification.  Although an attorney can 
certainly make alternative arguments to a jury, Mr. DePalma's 
arguments were not in the alternative, they were unguided, and 
inept shots at anything that moved, or that appeared to move, 
with no apparent purpose, thought, or strategy.  
                       During the trial he continued to lose 
                    credibility. He tried to discredit a 
                    disinterested doctor.  During cross- 
                    examination he implied that evidence was 
                    destroyed. . . During the summation he 
                    stated: '[t]he only thing is when you ask her 
                    [the physician] about the investigation, 
                    she's giving you a runaround.' . . . 
                       For counsel to rest on ‘strategy' 
                    necessitates the existence of one. This case 
                    lacked strategy. Instead, it was a 'useless 
                    charade.' U.S. v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, n. 
                    19. (1984). . . . 
                      Having no trial strategy, defense counsel 
                    improvised as they went along, proceeding 
                    from blunder to blunder with disastrous 
                    consequences. 
                     
          Dist. Ct. Op. at 20 (emphasis added).  We agree.   
     However, the district court's opinion can also be 
interpreted as holding that trial counsel had a strategy, but 
that it was not a "sound strategy." The court stated: "[b]ut no 
sound strategy existed in this case", and " []petitioner's 
counsel's post-trial testimony only confirms that there was no 
'sound trial strategy.'"  Dist. Ct. Op. at 13.  
     Assuming arguendo that the district court intended its 
conclusion that Mr. DePalma lacked a "sound" strategy to mean 
that he had no "reasonable" strategy, we will inquire to see if a 
different result is required under traditional habeas analysis.  
In doing so we assume that the record does support the state 
court's finding of a trial strategy.  For purposes of our 
analysis we will interpret Mr. DePalma's "game plan" as the 
equivalent of a trial strategy and proceed with our inquiry under 
§ 2254.   However, as discussed above, the parameters of this 
inquiry are not limited by the presumption of correctness 
afforded factual findings required by 28 U.S.C. § 2254.  That 
presumption does not attach to legal conclusions resulting from 
resolution of factual issues.  Once counsel is found to have had 
a strategy, the reasonableness of that strategy is a mixed 
question of fact and law to which the presumption of correctness 
does not attach. 
     Here, the state argues that the state court found that 
Berryman's trial counsel had a strategy or "theory of the case," 
that he made tactical decisions throughout the trial in 
furtherance of that strategy, and that the strategy was 
reasonable.  The state relies upon the presumption of correctness 
to strenuously argue that the state court findings of fact, 
including findings of the reasonableness of counsel's trial 
strategy, are supported by the record and consequently are 
presumptively correct.  
     The state's argument, however, confuses the findings of 
historical fact to which we must defer, with conclusions of law 
that we afford a plenary review.  The later goes directly to the 
performance prong of the Strickland test, thus requiring the 
application of legal principles.  
Horton v. Zant, 941 F.2d at 1462.  Assuming that the state court 
correctly found that trial counsel had a strategy, we find that 
it erred in its legal conclusion as to the reasonableness of Mr. 
DePalma's "strategy" as to each of the grounds set forth in 
Berryman's petition.   
     A.  Failure to use inconsistent identification testimony. 
     Berryman's conviction rested solely on the victim's 
uncorroborated out-of-court identification, and her in-court 
identification two years later.   As noted above, this case 
resulted in a total of four trials. Bludson was tried twice (and 
was ultimately acquitted), and Berryman and Bunch were jointly 
tried twice.  In each trial, Campos testified that the defendants 
played the following roles: 
     Bunch -- the first man with the knife who forced his way      
              into her car at the traffic light. 
 
     Bludson -- the second man to get into her car at the traffic  
                light. 
 
     Berryman -- the third man who waited in the blue car at the   
                 supermarket parking lot. 
The height of the three defendants is critical. Bunch, at 6'4" is 
the tallest.  Berryman is next and is of average height at 5'10". 
Bludson is the shortest at 5'5".  Thus Berryman is nearly half a 
foot taller than Bludson, and half a foot shorter than Bunch. 
Bunch, in turn, towers over Bludson, as he is nearly a full foot 
taller.  
     In the first Bludson trial, Campos testified that Bunch, the 
man with the knife, was approximately 5'11".  At that same trial, 
Campos testified that Bludson, the short man, was 5'10" and was 
the same size as Bunch.  She described Berryman as being the 
shortest. 
     In the second Bludson trial, apparently realizing the 
problems with her identification testimony, Campos retreated from 
that testimony and was effectively cross-examined on that issue.  
Because it goes to the heart of our analysis, we review that 
testimony at some length.  
 
          Q:  Well, how tall was the man with the 
          knife? [Bunch] 
 
          A: I can't tell you how tall he was.  I know 
          he was the tallest.  He wasn't that tall but 
          he was taller than both of them, than him and 
          the other one. 
 
          Q: The second man who got in the car, how 
          tall was he? 
 
          A: The second man? 
 
          Q: Yes. 
 
          A: That's him. 
 
          Q: How tall was he? 
 
          A: I don't know.  I don't know.  I can't tell 
          how tall he was. 
 
          Q: Before today you have been asked how tall 
          he was, haven't you? 
 
          A: Right. 
 
          Q: And haven't you said about 5'10"? 
 
          A: Yes, I told you that, 5'8", 5'10", I am 
          not sure if he's that height. 
 
          Q: And didn't you say that the first man was 
          about 5'11"? 
 
          A: About that. 
 
          Q: And the third man -- 
 
               [interruption by the Court] 
 
          Q: And the third man, you said was about 
          5'4"? 
 
          A: The third? 
           Q: Yes, the third man. 
 
          A: The third man.  I don't know what I said 
          how tall he was because I told him before and 
          I'm telling you right now I don't know. 
 
          Q: Weren't the first and second men about the 
          same size, about 5'10", 5'11"? 
 
          A: The first man -- 
 
               [lengthy objection by the State 
               which is overruled by the Court] 
 
          Q: Were not the first man with the knife and 
          the second man who got in the car, weren't 
          they about the same height, about 5'10", 
          5'11"? 
 
          A: The both of them that got in the car 
          first? 
 
          Q: Yes.  The two men that got in the car 
          first. 
 
          A: No. The other one was a little bit taller 
          than him.  Not much but he was the tallest, 
          like I said. 
 
          Q: Well, do you recall we had a hearing back 
          on July 17 and you were in a courtroom like 
          this and we had a hearing? 
 
          A: Yes. 
 
          Q: Do you recall being asked 'Was he taller 
          or shorter than the man with the knife?'  Do 
          you remember being asked that question? 
 
          A: Yes. 
 
          Q: And do you remember answering, 'I think 
          the same size.' 
 
          A: No, I never said that -- I said he was the 
          tallest, the other one maybe I said the same 
          size but I never said he was -- I remember 
          what I said. 
 
          Q: And the third man was much shorter than 
          those two, is that right? 
 
          A: The third guy? 
           Q: Yes. 
 
          A: Yes. 
 
          Q: And do you remember at that hearing you 
          testified when you said how tall he was? 
 
          A: Yes. 
 
          Q: And I think you said 6 feet. 
 
          A: I told you about 6 feet.  I don't know. 
 
          Q: And stand up, Mr. Bludson.  How tall did 
          you say -- I asked you how tall Mr. Bludson 
          was? 
 
          THE COURT: You mean as she views him standing 
          now? 
 
          DEFENSE COUNSEL: Yes. 
 
          A: I told you I don't know but I said -- I 
          remember I said about 5'9", 5'10". 
 
          Q: Well, looking at him now, how tall do you 
          think he is? 
 
          A: 5'7".  I don't know.  I don't know. 
 
(A16-18). 
     The district court noted that the descriptions of the three 
men given by Campos in the second Bludson trial differed 
radically from the actual height of each man, and differed from 
the identification testimony she gave at the first Bludson trial.  
Dist. Ct. Op. at 18.  The court further noted that despite the 
inconsistencies in Campos' descriptions, "petitioner's counsel 
never attempted to use the prior testimony to impeach Campos' 
identification of Berryman at the second trial.  Id. at 19.    
     Incredibly, when trial counsel explained his failure to use 
the inconsistent testimony to impeach Campos' identification of 
Berryman he said that it as a  "minor one" because "[t]here were 
a lot of major and substantial discrepancies in her story."  Id.   
As the district court correctly noted, that explanation "simply 
does not wash."   
          Petitioner's counsel had in his hands 
          material for a devastating cross-examination 
          of Campos on the critical issue in the case.  
          Because of his failure to confront her with 
          her prior sworn testimony, the jury did not 
          learn that she had previously described the 
          height of her attackers under oath, that she 
          had previously recanted prior testimony given 
          under oath and that her prior descriptions 
          were very different from her testimony at the 
          Bunch/Berryman trial. 
 
Id.  
     We agree. The district court correctly ruled that the state 
appellate court erred in minimizing the importance of this 
discrepancy. The Appellate Division held "[w]e conclude [that the 
lower court's] ruling has a reasonable basis in the record and 
that the failure to emphasize the victim's discrepancies 
regarding the height of her assailant. . . was neither fatally 
deficient nor prejudicial."  (slip op. at 23).  The district 
court concluded "[t]here is no way in which the failure to 
confront Campos with her prior inconsistent identification 
testimony can be justified as sound trial strategy or a 
reasonable strategic choice.  It was an error of law for the 
state courts to have so held."  Dist. Ct. Op. at 22.  Indeed, it 
borders on the inconceivable that a trial attorney would fail to 
inform a jury of Ms. Campos' prior problems with this 
identification whether or not he or she was also arguing that the 
rape had been fabricated. The reliability of this victim's 
uncorroborated identification of Berryman cuts directly to the 
heart of the only evidence against Berryman.  Mr. DePalma failed 
to use it.  That failure simply can not be condoned as reasonable 
trial strategy. The district court correctly concluded that it 
was wholly unreasonable.  
     B. Opening the Door to the Homicide and Robbery. 
     Detective Williams testified at the first Bunch\Berryman 
trial. He told the jury about Campos' statement describing the 
attack, and the circumstances under which she selected the 
photographs of Bunch, Bludson, and Berryman.  Williams' only 
other involvement had been to send the letters to the last known 
address of each defendant.   
     On cross-examination, counsel for both Bunch and Berryman 
decided to attack the lack of any thorough police investigation 
presumably to raise an inference that the police did not believe 
Campos.  Proceeding down that road, Mr. DePalma asked Williams 
why he did not try to locate the defendants. Williams responded 
that a sergeant told him that one of the defendants was the 
subject of another investigation and that he should "lay-off."   
     Predictably, the prosecutor seized this opportunity on re- 
direct by asking Williams who and what was being investigated, 
and Williams told the jury that Bunch was a suspect in a 
homicide/bank robbery.  Both defense counsel moved for a 
mistrial, but that motion was denied because defense counsel had 
opened the door. Mr. DePalma then called Sergeant Tomich as a 
defense witness, and Tomich confirmed that he told Williams to 
lay-off.  In response to the prosecutor's questions, Detective 
Tomich testified that the other investigation was a joint one, 
involving the FBI; that three men were alleged to have committed 
the homicide; and that Bunch's brother, Barry, had already been 
convicted of the crimes.  Defense counsel again greeted the 
fruits of his labors with a motion for a mistrial, which was 
denied as before.  
     As noted above, that first Bunch/Berryman trial ended in a 
mistrial because of juror misconduct. In the second trial, which 
began immediately, having learned absolutely nothing from the 
judge's rulings in the first trial, Mr. DePalma once again asked 
Williams why he had done nothing to pursue the investigation once 
the letter addressed to Berryman was returned by the post office.  
Counsel also attempted to elicit on cross examination that 
Williams was "skeptical of the circumstances that [the victim] 
was telling [him]."  An objection to that question was sustained 
and counsel then asked whether Williams had "any personal 
attitude as to what [the victim] was telling [him]."   
     On re-direct, the prosecutor argued that defense counsel had 
once again opened the door.  The trial court agreed, but 
commendably sought to ameliorate the prejudice that could flow 
from the line of questioning Mr. DePalma was insisting upon. The 
court ruled that Williams could only testify that the reason was 
the existence of another, unspecified, investigation involving 
Bunch which was unrelated to the sexual assault charge.  Aware of 
the precipice that Mr. DePalma was marching toward, the trial 
court also warned the prosecutor and the detective not to bring 
out the fact that the other investigation involved a murder.  
Williams then testified in accordance with the limitations 
imposed by the trial court. 
     Despite the trial judge's laudable attempt to shield the 
jury from unduly prejudicial information, Mr. DePalma obliviously 
pursued a line of re-cross examination designed to suggest that 
Williams would not lay-off an investigation involving crimes as 
serious as rape and kidnapping.  He did this even though he had 
just sat through a trial where this strategy had elicited 
testimony so damaging that he thought a mistrial was warranted.  
In order to counter the insinuations of Mr. DePalma's questions 
the prosecution sought, (to no one's surprise but Mr. DePalma's)  
and received, the court's permission to explain.  Mr. DePalma's 
examination of Detective Williams therefore forced the trial 
judge to allow the jury to hear the very information the judge 
had tried to shield them from, and the witness testified that the 
other investigation involved a bank robbery and a homicide.  
     Amazingly, apparently content with the progress of his "game 
plan,"  Mr. DePalma once again called Detective Tomich as a 
defense witness, and Tomich once again testified that the 
investigation of Bunch was still open; that Bunch's brother had 
already been convicted, but that two other suspects remained at 
large; that Bunch had not been charged because Tomich felt that 
he did not have enough evidence; and that Bunch would always be 
considered a prime suspect in the bank robbery\homicide. 
     On direct appeal, the Appellate Division rejected the 
argument that the trial court erred in admitting this testimony 
because defense counsel's line of questioning invited the 
prejudicial testimony.  At the post-conviction hearing, the state 
court concluded that Berryman's counsel had made a tactical 
decision to open the door to the bank robbery/homicide, opining 
that the decision was a "strategy to show the lack of police 
investigation so as to nullify the good affect (sic) the victim 
had on the jury."  A114.  That ruling was affirmed on appeal.  
     The district court disagreed. Trial counsel had conceded 
that it was risky to have "played with" this testimony. When 
asked to confirm that he had not intentionally opened the door to 
the prejudicial testimony he responded, "[n]o, but I played with 
it, lets put it that way." The prosecutor then stated, "[y]ou 
were taking a tremendous risk?" to which Mr. DePalma responded, 
"[r]ight." Dist. Ct. Op. at 29.  
     Indeed, it was foolhardy, and the district court correctly 
concluded that "it must rank as a striking instance of 
ineffective assistance of counsel."  Id.  at 30.  Berryman's 
attorney "proceeded relentlessly to elicit the irrelevant 
testimony that was so damaging to his client."  Id. at 29-30.   
     C. Failure to investigate potential defense witnesses. 
     The district court held that both Bludson, and Ms. Dos 
Santos could have discredited Campos' testimony, and counsel had 
no sound strategy to justify not using their testimony.  Dos 
Santos testified at the post conviction hearing that she and 
Campos were alone at the club and not with 15 to 20 other people 
as Campos said.  In addition to minor discrepancies, Dos Santos 
contradicted Campos' testimony that she had nothing to drink at 
the club.  Dos Santos testified that Campos had one or two beers 
while they were there.  
     Dos Santos was never contacted by defense counsel, or anyone 
acting on his behalf in preparation for trial. Mr. DePalma 
explained that his investigation of Dos Santos consisted of 
unsuccessfully attempting to subpoena her during the course of 
the trial.  He never spoke to her and never sent an investigator 
to look for her.  The state post-conviction court concluded that 
Mr. DePalma's actions regarding Ms. Dos Santos were reasonable 
because he was concerned her testimony would provide a 
"corroborative 'fresh-complaint' witness" and undermine his 
attempt to make some mileage from the victim's delay in reporting 
the rape.  The district court found that Mr. DePalma's failure to 
call Dos Santos could not be the result of a sound strategic 
choice because he never assembled the information necessary to 
make such a choice.  Dist. Ct. Op. at 32.  Accordingly, the 
district court concluded that Mr. DePalma's failure to call her 
could not have been the product of a reasoned strategic decision. 
     The Appellate Division also found that Berryman's counsel 
made reasonable efforts to locate Bludson and given Campos' 
"unshakable" identifications of the defendants, "evidence of 
Bludson's height would not be that helpful to the defense."  
(slip op. at 22).  Given the degree to which Ms. Campos 
equivocated and recanted portions of her description at Mr. 
Bludson's trial, this record does not support a conclusion that 
her testimony was "unshakable."  Indeed, Mr. Bludson's attorney 
was able to shake it sufficiently to raise a reasonable doubt as 
to the guilt of his client.  Moreover, Mr. DePalma had ample 
information to suggest that Bludson was an important defense 
witness. The district court realized that Bludson was an 
important witness if for no other reason than the discrepancies 
in the physical descriptions given by Campos at the two Bludson 
trials.  "By producing Bludson in court in connection with the 
previous testimony, defense counsel would have called into 
question the entire identification made by the witness and would 
have supported the 'wrong man' theory-of-the-case." Dist. Ct. Op. 
at 32.  However, despite Bludson's obvious importance to the 
case, Mr. DePalma did nothing more to locate Bludson than 
contacting the attorney who had represented Bludson at his 
criminal trial eight months earlier to see if he knew where 
Bludson was.  The district court characterized the failure to 
call Bludson as a failure to adequately prepare for trial, and 
not as a strategic decision.  Id. at 33. See Lewis v. 
Mazurkiewicz, 915 F.2d 106, 113 (3d. Cir. 1990). However, these 
two concepts are interwoven.  
     The right to counsel does not require that a criminal 
defense attorney leave no stone unturned and no witness 
unpursued. The district court quite correctly noted, however, 
that it does require a reasoned judgment as to the amount of 
investigation the particular circumstances of a given case 
require. An attorney need not fully investigate every potential 
avenue if he or she has reasonable grounds for not doing so. Id. 
at 114.   
          [S]trategic choices made after thorough 
          investigation of law and facts relevant to 
          plausible options are virtually 
          unchallengeable; and strategic choices made 
          after less than complete investigation are 
          reasonable precisely to the extent that 
          reasonable professional judgments support the 
          limitations in investigation. 
      
                     In other words, counsel has a duty to make 
                    reasonable investigations or to make a 
                    reasonable decision that makes particular 
                    investigations unnecessary.  In any 
                    ineffectiveness case, a particular decision 
                    not to investigate must be directly assessed 
                    for reasonableness in all the circumstances, 
                    applying a heavy measure of deference to 
                    counsel's judgments. 
           
 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-691.  Here, Bludson's significance to 
Berryman's defense required more than the minimal effort Mr. 
DePalma put forth to produce Bludson at Berryman's trial.  
     Bludson's mere presence at trial could have cast doubt upon 
Campos' identification. Campos testified that Bludson was the 
second man into the car and that he was the same height as Bunch, 
the first man into the car.  However, Bunch, who is 6' 4", could 
not easily be confused with Bludson, who is 5' 5".  Bludson's 
very presence in court at the Bunch/Berryman trials could have 
raised serious doubts about the victim's ability to identify her 
assailants. Indeed, had the jury seen Bludson, and learned of the 
inconsistencies in Campos' identifications and that she may have 
had a couple of beers before the incident, it is impossible to 
conclude with any degree of comfort that the verdict would have 
been the same.  Given the dramatic effect Bludson's mere presence 
could have had on the outcome of Berryman's trial, counsel was 
obligated to do more to find him.  
     Thus, whether the failure to call Bludson is viewed as 
failure to adequately prepare, or as an unreasonable choice of 
how to conduct the defense, it is clear that it fell below the 
standards required for reasonable representation of one's client. 
     D. Prejudice. 
     Even though we agree that trial counsel's woeful performance 
was not based upon any sound trial strategy, petitioner can not 
prevail under Strickland unless he was prejudiced by counsel's 
derelictions.  In meeting the prejudice prong of an 
ineffectiveness claim 
          [t]he defendant must show that there is a 
          reasonable probability that, but for 
          counsel's unprofessional errors, the result 
          of the proceeding would have been different. 
          A reasonable probability is a probability 
          sufficient to undermine confidence in the 
          outcome. 
 
Strickland, at 694.  In other words, we must determine if "there 
is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the 
factfinder would have had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt."  
Id. at 695.  "If ever there were a case where prejudice . . . has 
been established, it is the present case."  Dist. Ct. Op. at 33.  
"[I]t is highly probable that but for petitioner's attorney's 
egregious errors, the verdict as to petitioner would have been 
"not guilty." Id. at 34. 
     Berryman's jury never learned that Campos had previously 
described the height of her assailants very differently from her 
testimony at the Bunch/Berryman trials.  The jury was therefore 
never able to properly evaluate the strength of her 
identification. We note that this is not merely a matter of a 
defense attorney deciding to forgo questioning an identification 
witness about minor discrepancies in her description, or the fact 
that her estimated height was off by a couple of inches. This 
jury had a unique opportunity. The actions of the three 
assailants, their role in the assault, and their identity could 
be related to their heights in respect to one another regardless 
of how tall each actually was. Campos' inability to consistently 
describe the actions of Berryman who was nearly half a foot 
taller than one defendant, and nearly half a foot shorter than 
the other, was information the jury needed in order to weigh the 
accuracy of Campos' identification. The prejudice to Berryman is 
obvious.  
     Berryman's guilt rested entirely on the accuracy of Ms. 
Campos' identification. Trial counsel had weapons that he could 
have used to attack that identification. He used none of them. It 
should have been obvious that Campos' inconsistent identification 
testimony from the Bludson trials could raise serious questions 
in the minds of the jurors regarding Campos' credibility and/or 
her ability to identify her assailants. Trial counsel regarded it 
as "minor" and didn't bother to use it. Thus the jury never knew 
of Campos' difficulty identifying her assailants. The 
inconsistent description is made all the more compelling by a 
discrepancy in Ms. Campos' testimony that the district court 
notes.  
                    In her initial statement to authorities, 
                    Campos said that she had been blindfolded 
                    with her stockings from the moment the two 
                    men got into her car at the traffic light 
                    until she was returned to her car. Her trial 
                    testimony, that the first man in her car 
                    immediately ordered her to remove her 
                    stockings, tends to corroborate this version. 
                    If this were so, she could not have 
                    identified petitioner at all since, according 
                    to her testimony, he had not entered the 
                    picture until well after she would have been 
                    blindfolded. 
                     
          Dist. Ct. Op. at 4, n. 1.  
     In addition, Ms. Dos Santos' testimony could have 
established that Ms. Campos had consumed some alcohol immediately 
prior to the rape. That is relevant to the victim's ability to 
accurately identify her assailants, yet the jury was never 
informed of this.  
     Counsel's failure to use any of these avenues in defense of 
his client is bad enough. Worse yet, Mr. DePalma's handling of 
Detective Williams and Detective Tomich informed the jury of 
highly prejudicial and irrelevant information, and defeated the 
trial judge's efforts to shield Mr. Berryman from the dangers of 
Mr. DePalma's line of questioning  regarding the unrelated bank 
robbery\homicide investigation. Once Mr. DePalma opened the door 
to that information, "the prosecutor plunged the stilette which 
petitioner's counsel had handed him." Dist. Ct. Op. at 40.  
     Counsel's derelictions are severe, and seriously undermine  
the reliability of Berryman's conviction. The district court 
quite correctly held that Berryman is entitled to the relief the 
court granted.  
 
                               VI. 
     After the district court granted Berryman relief, after this 
case was argued before this panel, and while the state's appeal 
was pending, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective 
Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), Pub. L. 104-132, 110 Stat. 
1214.  Section 104 of the AEDPA amends 28 U.S.C. § 2254, the 
statute under which Berryman sought, and was granted, relief.  
Section 104(2) of the AEDPA redesignates § 2254(d)as § 2254(e), 
which then provides that a state court's determination of a 
factual issue shall be presumed to be correct and further 
provides that a habeas petitioner "shall have the burden of 
rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing 
evidence."  In addition, Section 104(3) adds a new § 2254(d) 
which reads: 
          An application for a writ of habeas corpus on 
          behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the 
          judgment of a State court shall not be 
          granted with respect to any claim that was 
          adjudicated on the merits in State court 
          proceedings unless the adjudication of the 
          claim -- 
 
          (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary 
          to, or involved an unreasonable application 
          of, clearly established Federal law, as 
          determined by the Supreme Court of the United 
          States, or 
 
          (2) resulted in a decision that was based on 
          an unreasonable determination of the facts in 
          light of the evidence presented in the State 
          court proceeding. 
 
     We have previously noted the enactment of the AEDPA and have 
applied § 104's amendments to a state prisoner's habeas petition, 
see Dickerson v. Vaughn, 90 F.3d 87 (3d Cir. 1996); however, we 
have not expressly determined if Congress intended that § 104 of 
the AEDPA applies retroactively to appeals or to petitions that 
were pending when the Act was passed.  The Act specifically 
provides that it is to apply to death penalty cases "pending on 
or after the date of the enactment of the Act", i.e., April 24, 
1996. § 211 of Pub. L. 104-132.  However, the AEDPA is silent as 
to its application to pending habeas petitions in non-capital 
cases.  Of the circuit courts of appeals that have had the 
opportunity to consider the retroactivity issue, two courts have 
determined that the AEDPA's changes to § 2254 are not to be 
applied retroactively, see Boria v. Keene, 90 F.3d 36 (2d. Cir. 
1996) and Edens v. Hannigan, 87 F.3d 1109, 1112 n. 1 (10th Cir. 
1996), and one court has found that the AEDPA is to be applied 
retroactively in non-capital cases.  Lindh v. Murphy, No. 95- 
3608, 1996 WL 517290, (7th Cir. Sept. 12, 1996)(en banc).   
     In any event, there does seem to be agreement that Section 
104(c) of the AEDPA changes the standard of review for cases 
where state prisoners challenge their convictions on the basis of 
alleged constitutional violations.  We have opined, in dicta, 
that § 104(c) establishes a "more deferential test,"  Dickerson 
v. Vaughn, 90 F.3d at 90; however, we have not determined the 
extent of the deference that federal habeas courts  must afford 
to the legal or the factual determinations made by state courts. 
     In Lindh v. Murphy, a majority of the judges on the Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that § 104(c) of the AEDPA 
"for the first time specifies the appropriate treatment of legal 
determinations by state courts."  1996 WL at * 2.  Specifically, 
the Lindh majority held, with regard to the scope of review under 
§ 104(3)(d)(1) of the AEDPA, that when the issue does not involve 
the meaning of the Constitution, but rather its application to a 
particular set of facts, i.e., when a mixed question of law and 
fact is presented, a district court can only grant habeas relief 
when the state court's decision "reflects ‘an unreasonable 
application of' the law."  Id. at * 13.  According to the Lindhmajority, 
the answer to the question of whether the state court's 
determination of a mixed question of law and fact is 
unreasonable, "requires federal courts to take into account the 
care with which the state court considered the subject."  Id. at 
* 14.  The federal habeas court must defer to the state court's 
determination of a mixed question of law and fact where that 
determination is reasonable, that is, within the boundaries of 
the law established by the Supreme Court.  Id.  It is only when 
the federal habeas court is convinced that the state court's 
determination of a mixed question of law and fact constitutes a 
grave error can the state court's determination be found 
unreasonable and only then can the federal habeas court upset a 
judgment of the state court.  Id. (Section 2254(d)(1), as amended 
by the AEDPA, "tells federal courts: Hands off, unless the 
judgment in place is based on an error grave enough to be called 
‘unreasonable.'").  As the Lindh majority wrote: 
          The Supreme Court of the United States sets 
          the bounds of what is "reasonable"; a state 
          decision within those limits must be 
          respected -- not because it is right, or 
          because federal courts must abandon their 
          independent decisionmaking, but because the 
          grave remedy of upsetting a judgment entered 
          by another judicial system after full 
          litigation is reserved for grave occasions.  
          That is the principal change effected by § 
          2254(d)(1). 
 
Id. 
     The Attorney General argues that the AEDPA is applicable to 
this case and further argues that the changes wrought to § 
2254(d) by § 104(3) of the AEDPA require that the district 
court's grant of habeas relief to Berryman be reversed and his 
conviction reinstated.  More specifically, the Attorney General 
contends that the decision in Lindh v. Murphy requires that the 
district court's decision here be reversed because the state 
court's determination that Berryman's counsel was not ineffective 
was "a reasonable, good faith interpretation of existing 
precedent."  See Attorney General's letter of October 2,1996. 
     However, we need not determine whether the AEDPA's changes 
to the habeas statute under which Berryman was granted relief are 
to be applied retroactively because we are convinced that the 
record clearly and convincingly shows that his trial counsel was 
ineffective even if the AEDPA establishes a more deferential 
standard.  Further, we are convinced that even if we apply the 
standard of review for state court resolution of mixed questions 
of fact and law discussed in Lindh v. Murphy, Berryman would 
prevail. 
     As recited in Part IV of this opinion, the district court's 
opinion can be read as holding that Berryman's trial counsel had 
no trial strategy at all or it can be read as agreeing with the 
state court that trial counsel had a strategy but disagreeing 
with the state court's determination that the strategy was 
reasonable.  As we understand the changes made to § 2254 by § 
104(3) of the AEDPA, § 104(3)(d)(1) of the AEDPA would apply if 
the district court's opinion is read as holding that trial 
counsel's strategy was not reasonable and § 104(3)(d)(2) would 
apply if the district court's opinion is read as holding that 
trial counsel had no strategy at all. 
     In regard to § 104(3)(d)(1), the Attorney General submits 
that Lindh v. Murphy requires that the federal habeas court must 
accept the state trial court's determination that trial counsel's 
strategy was reasonable because that determination was a 
reasonable, good faith interpretation of existing Supreme Court 
precedent.  However, and assuming arguendo that Lindh correctly 
interpreted this section of the AEDPA, we disagree with the 
Attorney General's contention that the state court's 
determination was reasonable.  We have already discussed why 
trial counsel's failure to use Campos' inconsistent 
identification testimony was wholly unreasonable, why his opening 
the door to the homicide and bank robbery investigation was 
foolhardy, irrelevant and damaging, and why his failure to 
investigate potential defense witnesses could not be considered 
the product of a reasoned strategic decision.  Based on that 
discussion, we are convinced that the state court's determination 
that trial counsel had a reasonable trial strategy is an "error 
grave enough to be called ‘unreasonable.'" Lindh, at * 14.  Mr. 
DePalma's performance was severely deficient and his errors were 
"so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel' 
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment."  Strickland, at 687.  As a 
result of his errors Berryman was deprived of a fair trial.  Id.   
Given that woefully inadequate and deficient performance and the 
prejudice that performance caused Berryman, we cannot uphold the 
state court's determination that trial counsel had a reasonable 
trial strategy.  That determination was clearly an unreasonable 
application of Strickland to the facts of this case.    
     In regard to § 104(3)(d)(2) of the AEDPA, a federal court 
must afford the presumption of correctness to factual 
determinations made by a state court unless the state court's 
decision "was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts 
in light of the evidence presented" in the state court.  The 
habeas statute under which Berryman filed his petition provided 
that factual findings made by a state court are presumed correct 
"if fairly supported by the record."  Reese v. Fulcomer, 946 F.2d 
at 254.  The AEDPA did not dramatically change this provision of 
habeas jurisprudence.  After all, a state court determination of 
a factual issue which was not fairly supported by the record can 
hardly be said to be a reasonable determination.  Nonetheless, we 
will assume arguendo that the AEDPA establishes a more 
deferential standard which federal habeas courts must afford to 
factual determinations of state courts.   
     However, even applying the most conceivably deferential 
standard to the factual determination of the state court that 
trial counsel had a strategy, we conclude that that determination 
was unreasonable in light of the evidence presented in the state 
court.  Trial counsel readily admitted that he had no strategy, 
but only a game plan, the parameters of which he could not 
recall.  He was unable to explain what his third theory may have 
been.  At one point in his closing he suggested that Campos 
fabricated the entire rape, and moments later he told the jury 
that Campos was not lying.  As we noted earlier, counsel can 
certainly argue in the alternative, but that is not what counsel 
did as he contradicted himself in front of the jury.  Counsel's 
own testimony, and the record of his actions at the trial, 
plainly demonstrate that the state court's factual determination 
that trial counsel had a strategy was an unreasonable 
determination in light of the evidence presented in the state 
court proceedings.  
     We therefore conclude that the resolution of this habeas 
case does not differ under the habeas statute under which 
Berryman originally filed his petition or under the habeas 
statute as amended by § 104 of the AEDPA. 
         
                               VII. 
     In conclusion, we hold that petitioner has met both prongs 
of the Strickland test and find that he was denied his Sixth 
Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel.  The order of 
the district court granting a petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus will be affirmed. 
